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Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
Sarah Auster
Department of Decision Sciences and IGIER, Bocconi University
A buyer makes an offer to a privately informed seller for a good of uncertain qual-
ity. Quality determines both the seller’s valuation and the buyer’s valuation, and
the buyer evaluates each contract according to its worst-case performance over
a set of probability distributions. This paper demonstrates that the contract that
maximizes the minimum payoff over all possible probability distributions of qual-
ity is a screening menu that separates all types, whereas the optimal contract
for any given probability distribution is a posted price, which induces bunch-
ing. Using the ε-contamination model, according to which the buyer’s utility is a
weighted average of his single prior expected utility and the worst-case scenario,
the analysis further shows that for intermediate degrees of confidence, the opti-
mal mechanism combines features of both of these contracts.
Keywords. Ambiguity, optimal contracting, lemons problem.
JEL classification. D81, D82, D86.
1. Introduction
The optimal design of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information has been
the subject of investigation for several decades and its theoretical analysis has gener-
ated an array of powerful results. Most of this literature adopts the subjective expected
utility model according to which contracting parties have a single subjective prior belief
about the fundamentals. In real-life contracting situations, e.g., when buying a house
or when investing in a foreign country, the involved parties rarely have a precise idea
about the underlying probability distribution, either because they do not have enough
experience or because they do not have sufficient information. It is well established
that a lack of knowledge about the probability distribution can have important behav-
ioral implications that are incompatible with the subjective expected utility hypothe-
sis. This gives rise to the question of how the presence of uncertainty over probabilistic
scenarios affects the optimal design of contracts and the implemented allocation. This
paper analyzes a bilateral trade model that allows for common values—an important
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feature in many real-life contracting situations—and an ambiguous trading environ-
ment.
In the environment considered, there is a risk-neutral buyer (she) who makes an of-
fer to a risk-neutral seller (he), who is privately informed about the quality of his good.
The paper first presents an introductory example in which quality is either high or low
and then studies the richer environment in which quality belongs to an interval of val-
ues. In contrast to the classic setting, it is assumed that the buyer has ambiguous beliefs
about the distribution of quality, which determines the valuation of both trading parties.
The buyer’s preferences are represented by the maxmin expected utility model (Gilboa
and Schmeidler 1989), according to which the buyer evaluates her choices with the most
pessimistic probability distribution in a set of distributions.
For the case where this set is a singleton, Samuelson (1984) shows that the optimal
mechanism is a take-it-or-leave-it price. The results of this paper demonstrate that if
the extent of ambiguity the buyer faces is sufficiently large and if values are interdepen-
dent, the optimal mechanism is a screening menu rather than a posted price. To show
this, the paper first studies the case of Knightian uncertainty, where the buyer consid-
ers the worst-case payoff over all possible probability distributions of quality. Here the
buyer optimally proposes a contract that equalizes her payoff across all seller types and
thereby hedges against the ambiguity she perceives. This contract can be interpreted
as maximally robust, since it yields the same expected payoff across all possible proba-
bilistic scenarios. The analysis shows that the nature of the robust mechanism crucially
depends on the relation between the buyer’s and the seller’s valuations: if the buyer’s val-
uation strictly increases in the seller’s type, the optimal mechanism is a screening menu
that perfectly separates all seller types, whereas if the buyer’s and seller’s valuations are
independent, the maximally robust mechanism is the pooling price. The intuition is that
a separating menu allows the price of the good to increase with the buyer’s valuation of
the good, thereby balancing her payoff across the different realizations of her and the
seller’s valuation.
The paper also studies the case in which the buyer’s ignorance is less extreme. To
parameterize the buyer’s demand for robustness, her preferences are represented by the
ε-contamination model, a special case of the maxmin expected utility model, which
nests the case of Knightian uncertainty on the one hand and the case of a single sub-
jective prior belief on the other hand. According to this representation, the buyer has a
reference distribution but entertains some doubt regarding that distribution, captured
by the parameter ε. The buyer’s confidence in the model distribution determines the
nature of the optimal mechanism. If ε is sufficiently small, the optimal mechanism is a
posted price as in Samuelson (1984), whereas if ε is sufficiently large, the optimal mech-
anism is a screening menu that perfectly hedges against ambiguity. For intermediate
values of ε, the optimal contract combines features of both of these mechanisms: low
quality sellers are bunched at a base price, while high quality sellers are separated by the
mechanism. This hybrid contract solves the trade-off between maximizing the buyer’s
expected utility evaluated at the reference distribution and limiting her minimal payoff
in the worst-case scenario. In particular, by screening sellers with a valuation above the
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base price, the buyer avoids the possibility of trading with probability 0 in some states
of the world.
Given the longstanding debate on the economic implications of ambiguity as op-
posed to risk, I discuss how the optimal contract in the proposed setting differs from the
benchmark model in which the buyer is ambiguity neutral but risk averse. Although the
optimal contract under risk aversion may also be a separating menu, the cases in which
it coincides with the optimal mechanism under ambiguity aversion are nongeneric.
Moreover, the discussion demonstrates that there are situations in which a higher de-
gree of risk aversion makes the pooling price optimal, while a higher degree of ambiguity
aversion generally favors separation.
Finally, in some applications of the maxmin expected utility model, results crucially
rely on the feature that preferences are kinked (e.g., Dow and Ribeiro da Costa Werlang
1992; Condie and Ganguli 2017). This is not the case in the model studied here be-
cause the optimality of separating menus in the considered environment is driven by the
buyer’s desire to hedge against ambiguity, a feature of all decision models that capture
ambiguity averse behavior. This is illustrated by extending the characterization of the
optimal contract for the binary type case to the smooth ambiguity model, introduced
by Klibanoff et al. (2005). The characterization shows that the solution of the buyer’s
optimization problem under smooth ambiguity aversion is a convex combination of the
solution under maxmin expected utility and ambiguity neutrality.
Related literature
This paper is part of a growing literature on robust contracting in an uncertain envi-
ronment, which includes work on procurement contracts (Garrett 2014), optimal dele-
gation mechanisms (Frankel 2014; Carrasco and Moreira 2013), and optimal incentive
contracts in the presence of moral hazard (Carroll 2015; Carroll and Meng 2016; Antic´
2014). Crucially, and in contrast to most prior work in mechanism design, the princi-
pal in these models evaluates contracts according to their worst-case performance, e.g.,
over the agent’s preferences or over the set of available technologies.
There is also a small number of papers that study the maxmin optimal contract
in the canonical principal–agent problem with hidden information, as this one does.
In contrast to this work, existing papers assume that the principal’s and agent’s valu-
ations are independent. Bergemann and Schlag (2011) show that under the assump-
tion of independent private values, the maxmin optimal mechanism is a posted price.
Intuitively, if the principal only faces ambiguity over the agent’s acceptance decision,
the worst-case probabilistic scenario is always the one that maximizes the probabil-
ity that the agent rejects. This implies that the optimization problem under maxmin
preferences is equivalent to the optimization problem under a single pessimistic prior
and Samuelson’s (1984) result applies. Bergemann and Schlag (2011) also consider the
mechanism that minimizes maximal regret. In contrast to maxmin expected utility, the
minimax regret criterion generates a regret trade-off that makes randomization across
prices optimal. In recent work, also Carrasco et al. (2017) consider a monopoly pricing
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model with independent private values and a principal with maxmin preferences. In
their environment, the principal has partial probabilistic information about the agent’s
valuation, such as the mean or the variance, which makes a random pricing rule opti-
mal.
There exists a complementary line of literature that studies mechanism design prob-
lems in which the agent rather than the principal faces uncertainty about the underlying
probabilistic environment. This literature includes the work of Bose and Mutuswami
(2012) and Wolitzky (2016), both of which investigate the implementability of efficient
trade in the canonical Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) environment with the assump-
tion that agents perceive uncertainty about the probability distribution of the oppo-
nent’s type. Also Bose et al. (2006), Bose and Daripa (2009), and Bodoh-Creed (2012)
introduce ambiguity on the agent’s side, but in contrast to the work mentioned before,
the focus of these papers lies on revenue maximization. Finally, Bose and Renou (2014)
and di Tillio et al. (2017) show that the designer may benefit from introducing ambiguity
via the mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the introductory ex-
ample, which demonstrates the main features of robust contracting in the considered
environment. Section 3 then introduces the main model. I first characterize the optimal
contract for the case in which the buyer considers the worst-case scenario over all pos-
sible probability distributions. Next, I study the case of moderate ambiguity and show
how the features of the optimal contract depend on the buyer’s attitude toward the am-
biguity she faces. Section 4 discusses the differences to risk aversion and explains how
the findings of the model extend when preferences are smooth rather than kinked. Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2. Introductory example
A risk-neutral buyer makes an offer to a risk-neutral seller who possesses one unit of an
indivisible good. The seller is privately informed about the quality of the object, which
can be either high or low. Quality determines both the seller’s and the buyer’s valuations,
implying that the seller knows both his own valuation c ∈ {cl ch} as well as the buyer’s
valuation v ∈ {vl vh}, whereas the buyer knows neither of these values. I assume that
both the seller and the buyer value high quality more than low quality, i.e., ch > cl, vh >
vl, and that the buyer’s value always exceeds the seller’s value: vi > ci, i = lh. The buyer
proposes a menu of contracts, {(x(c) t(c))}c∈{clch}, consisting of a trading probability
x(c) and a transfer t(c) for each type of good. If the seller reveals truthfully his type,
the buyer’s and the seller’s payoffs as a function of the seller’s type are given by πb(c) =
x(c)v(c)− t(c) and πs(c)= t(c)− x(c)c, respectively.
The buyer faces ambiguity over the quality distribution and has maxmin expected
utility preferences (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989). Under this representation, a deci-
sion maker evaluates her choices with the worst probability distribution in a convex
set of distributions. Letting σ denote the probability that the quality of the object is
high, this amounts to the buyer minimizing over an interval of values of σ . Let Eσ
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denote the expectation operator with respect σ . The buyer’s payoff function is then
given by
inf
σ∈[σσ] Eσ
[
πb(c)
]

The buyer maximizes this payoff function subject to the incentive and individual ratio-
nality constraints of each type of seller:
t(cl)− x(cl)cl ≥ t(ch)− x(ch)cl
t(ch)− x(ch)ch ≥ t(cl)− x(cl)ch
t(ci)− x(ci)ci ≥ 0 i= lh
Since the seller knows his type, the constraints of the buyer’s optimization problem are
not affected by the presence of ambiguity in this environment. This, and the fact that
the buyer’s objective is weakly decreasing in t(cl) and t(ch), implies that the solution
to the buyer’s optimization problem satisfies some well established properties (see, for
example, Salanié 2005, Chapter 2): the incentive compatibility constraint of the low type
seller and the individual rationality constraint of the high type seller are binding, while
the remaining constraints are slack. Furthermore, the low type seller trades with prob-
ability 1. With these properties, the menu of contracts is completely characterized by
the trading probability of the high type seller x(ch). For notational convenience, let this
probability be denoted by α:{(
x(cl) t(cl)
)

(
x(ch) t(ch)
)}= {(1αch + (1− α)cl) (ααch)}
Remark. Note that there are two alternative interpretations of the model. In the inter-
pretation followed throughout the paper, the good is indivisible and α is the probability
of trade. In an alternative interpretation, the seller possesses one unit of a perfectly di-
visible good, utility functions are multiplicatively linear, and α is a quantity. Under this
interpretation, the menu is a nonlinear pricing schedule with a quantity discount. Low
quality is traded in large quantity at a low price, while high quality is traded in small
quantity at a high price.
Given the properties stated above, the buyer’s payoff can be stated as a function of α
and her optimization problem becomes
max
α∈[01]
inf
σ∈[σσ]
{
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch + (1− α)cl
)}

To derive the solution to this problem, consider first the case in which the set of proba-
bility distributions is a singleton, so that the buyer is a subjective expected utility max-
imizer with a single prior σ . Samuelson (1984) shows that the buyer’s optimal contract
is a posted price, which the seller either accepts or rejects. In the two-type setting, this
result can easily be seen by considering the buyer’s objective function. Since Eσ [πb] is
linear in α, the optimization problem has a corner solution. The mechanism character-
ized by α = 0 is a separating price equal to cl, while that characterized by α = 1 is the
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pooling price equal to ch. Pooling is optimal if the probability that the seller’s type is
high is large enough, which is the case if
σvh + (1− σ)vl − ch ≥ (1− σ)(vl − cl) or, equivalently, σ ≥ ch − cl
vh − cl 
Proposition 2.1 shows that if the set of probability distributions is not a singleton,
the buyer’s optimal contract is a posted price if and only if this price is optimal under all
probability distributions in the interval [σσ]. Otherwise, the buyer optimally offers a
separating menu.
Proposition 2.1. Let σ˜ := ch−clvh−cl . The buyer optimally proposes a menu characterized by
α∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if σ ≤ σ˜
1 if σ ≥ σ˜
vl − cl
vh − cl otherwise.
See Appendix A for the proofs of most of the propositions.
The parameter σ˜ is the subjective prior under which all values of α yield the same
payoff. If σ ≥ σ˜ , the optimal value of α is equal to 1, since the contract that maximizes
the buyer’s expected payoff is the pooling price ch for all σ ∈ [σσ]. Similarly, if σ ≤ σ˜ ,
the optimal value of α is equal to 0, because the separating price cl is optimal for all
σ ∈ [σσ]. Ambiguity aversion thus affects the buyer’s utility but not her choice of con-
tract. If σ < σ˜ < σ , the buyer optimally proposes a separating menu, characterized by
α∗ = vl−clvh−cl . This value of α is the contracting parameter under which the buyer’s payoff
conditional on the seller’s type being high equals her payoff conditional on the seller’s
type being low. Intuitively, offering a separating menu rather than a posted price al-
lows the buyer to limit the extent of ambiguity over the probability with which the seller
accepts and the net gain when trade occurs, thereby balancing her payoff across the
different states of the world. The menu characterized by α∗ = vl−clvh−cl can be viewed as a
robust contract because it makes the buyer’s payoff independent of the underlying type
distribution and thereby yields a “safe” payoff equal to (vh−ch)(vl−cl)vh−cl . Offering a separat-
ing menu thus hedges against ambiguity in this environment. Hedging is optimal if and
only if the environment is sufficiently ambiguous and the buyer is sufficiently ambiguity
averse, i.e., if [σσ] is large enough.
This is illustrated in Figure 1. Under the assumption σ < σ˜ < σ , the expected payoff
of a buyer with subjective prior σ is downward sloping in α (solid line), while the ex-
pected payoff of a buyer with subjective prior σ is upward sloping in α (dashed line). All
expected payoff functions Eσ [πb], σ ∈ (σσ) lie in between these two benchmarks and
intersect at α∗ = vl−clvh−cl . For α <
vl−cl
vh−cl , the worst case for the buyer is that the probability
with which the seller has a high quality good is large, whereas for α > vl−clvh−cl , the worst
case is that the probability of this event is small. Since the buyer’s expected payoff eval-
uated at σ is upward sloping in α, while her expected payoff evaluated at σ is downward
sloping in α, her maxmin expected payoff (thick curve) is maximized at α∗ = vl−clvh−cl .
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Figure 1. Expected payoffs Eσ [πb] for σ ∈ [σσ].
3. The main model
Consider now the case where the seller’s type takes a value in the interval [01]. As be-
fore, the seller knows his own valuation for the object c and also the buyer’s valuation v,
whereas the buyer is uncertain about these values. Let the differentiable function v(c)
define the relation between the two values, and assume v′(c) ≥ 0 and v(c) > c for all
c ∈ [01]. That is, both the seller’s and the buyer’s value for the object are increasing in
its quality, and the buyer’s value strictly exceeds the seller’s value.
In this environment a menu of contracts is defined as {(x(c) t(c))}c∈[01], and the
incentive and individual rationality constraints of the seller are given by
t(c)− x(c)c ≥ t(c˜)− x(c˜)c ∀c c˜
t(c)− x(c)c ≥ 0 ∀c
Samuelson (1984, p. 997) shows that this set of constraints implies that x(c) weakly
decreases in c and that π ′s(c) = −x(c) almost everywhere. With these properties, the
buyer’s and seller’s payoffs can be derived as a function of x(c) only. Condition π ′s(c) =
−x(c) together with πs(1)= 0 yields
πs(c)=
∫ 1
c
x(u)du
The term
∫ 1
c x(u)du is the information rent paid to type c. The buyer’s payoff as a func-
tion of the seller’s type, πb(c), is then given by the difference between the expected value
of the realized gains from trade and the information rent paid to the seller. That is,
πb(c)= x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(u)du
where (c)≡ v(c)− c denotes the gains from trade when the seller’s type is c.
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3.1 Unique subjective prior
Consider first the benchmark case, where the buyer has a single prior belief F . This
specification corresponds to the standard Bayesian setting, for which Samuelson (1984)
shows that the optimal mechanism for the buyer is a posted price. Assume that F is
twice differentiable and let f (c) = F ′(c) denote the density function. Defining 	 as the
set of nonincreasing functions x : [01] → [01], the buyer solves the problem
max
x∈	
EF
[
πb(c)
]= ∫ 1
0
(
x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(u)du
)
f (c)dc (I)
After an integration by parts, the buyer’s expected payoff can be written as EF [πb(c)] =∫ 1
0 ((c)f (c)− F(c))x(c)dc, where the function H(c) ≡ (c)f (c) − F(c) captures the
marginal benefit of increasing x(c). If H(c) is strictly decreasing in c, the optimal mech-
anism is characterized by the step function
x∗(c)=
{
1 if c ≤ c∗
0 if c > c∗
where c∗ is such that H(c∗) = 0 if H(1) < 0 and c∗ = 1 otherwise. This mechanism cor-
responds to a posted price equal to c∗. The buyer’s payoff associated to the posted
price varies with the seller’s type c. In particular, the minimum payoff is given by
π¯min ≡ {(0) − c∗0}, which is obtained either when the seller is of the lowest type so
that the buyer’s valuation is (0) or when the seller rejects the buyer’s offer.
3.2 Knightian uncertainty
Consider now the polar case, where the buyer evaluates possible contracts by their
worst-case performance over all probability distributions on [01]. This case of Knight-
ian uncertainty has received a lot of attention in the literature on robust contracting, e.g.,
Frankel (2014), Garrett (2014), and Carroll (2015). Under this specification, the buyer
solves the problem
max
x∈	
inf
c∈[01]
{
x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(u)du
}
 (II)
The following proposition characterizes the solution to this problem.
Proposition 3.1. The unique solution of problem (II) is given by
x∗(c)= exp
[
−
∫ c
0
v′(t)
(t)
dt
]
for all c ∈ [01]
The optimal mechanism for a buyer who minimizes over all types c ∈ [01] is a
mechanism that equalizes her payoff across all types. Noting that π ′b(c) = x′(c)(c) +
x(c)v′(c), the mechanism that yields a constant payoff across c solves the differential
equation
x′(c)(c)+ x(c)v′(c)= 0
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with x(0) = 1. The solution to this differential equation is given by the function x∗(c),
as defined in Proposition 3.1. Since x∗ is nonincreasing, the monotonicity constraint for
incentive compatibility is automatically satisfied. The mechanism characterized by x∗
can be viewed as the analogue to the contract characterized by α∗ = vl−clvh−cl in the binary
case. Its key feature is that it yields a payoff that does not depend on the underlying
probability distribution over types. Instead, the buyer obtains a safe payoff equal to
π¯max ≡ (1)exp
[
−
∫ 1
0
v′(t)
(t)
dt
]

It should be emphasized that the nature of the mechanism characterized by x∗(c)
crucially depends on the relation between the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s valua-
tion. Noting that the first derivative of the optimal trading probability is given by
x∗′(c)= −exp
[
−
∫ c
0
v′(t)
(t)
dt
]
v′(c)
(c)

it is easy to see that x∗(c) strictly decreases in c if and only if the buyer’s valuation v(c)
strictly increases in c. In particular, if there are subsets of [01] for which v′(c) = 0, the
buyer optimally bunches types on those subsets but separates the rest. The intuition is
that a strictly increasing v(c) favors trading with high types and thus calls for an asym-
metric treatment of sellers so as to equalize the buyer’s payoff across types. Vice versa, if
v(c) is constant on some part of the domain, equalizing the buyer’s payoff across sellers
requires bunching seller types in that part of the domain.
In the independent private value case, where v(c) = v¯ for all c ∈ [01], the optimal
mechanism is, in fact, characterized by x∗(c)= 1 for all c. This mechanism corresponds
to the pooling price, which yields a safe payoff equal to v¯− 1. Once we move away from
the independent private value case, the optimal mechanism is no longer the pooling
price—or any other posted price—but a separating menu. To gain some intuition, note
that if the buyer offers the pooling price and v′(c) > 0 on some part of the domain, the
buyer obtains her minimum payoff when trading with the lowest type. This minimum
payoff can be increased by reducing the trading probability of higher types so as to re-
duce the information rent paid to the lowest type. Under the optimal contract instead,
the trading probability strictly decreases on the parts of the domain where v strictly in-
creases. This allows the buyer to offset the additional information rent paid to lower
types with a higher probability of trade, thereby balancing the buyer’s payoff across seller
types. In particular, if v is strictly increasing on the whole domain, the maximally robust
mechanism is a screening menu that separates all seller types.
Remark. Note that if instead v′(c) ≤ 0 for all c ∈ [01], the problem is less interesting.
Here πb(c) necessarily decreases in c, implying that the worst-case scenario always in-
cludes the degenerate distribution with a mass point at c = 1. The buyer thus optimally
proposes the pooling price. Also when the assumption of strictly positive gains from
trade is violated, the contracting problem becomes trivial. In particular, if there ex-
ists some c˜ ∈ [01] such that (c˜) ≤ 0, not trading is a weakly dominant strategy for the
buyer: if the seller’s type is c˜ with probability 1, there is no contract that can yield a
strictly positive payoff for the buyer.
184 Sarah Auster Theoretical Economics 13 (2018)
It is interesting to point out that whenever the gains from trade are constant across
quality so that (c)= δ, the mechanism that maximizes (II) is characterized by
x∗(c)= e− cδ for all c ∈ [01]
The trading probability is thus exponentially distributed, scaled by a factor δ. One fea-
ture of the exponential probability distribution is that the density function and the de-
cumulative distribution function decrease proportionally so that the hazard rate is con-
stant.1 For the optimal trading probability function x∗(c), this implies that the expected
value of the realized gains from trade, x∗(c)δ, and the information rent,
∫ 1
c x
∗(u)du,
change at the same rate, thereby yielding a constant payoff in c. Clearly, the optimality of
the exponential probability distribution in the problem under consideration hinges on
the assumption that gains from trade are indeed constant. However, the result points to
a more general property of the optimal mechanism, namely an inverse relation between
the gains from trade (c) and the hazard rate of x∗(c): if gains from trade are increasing
in c, x∗(c) has a decreasing hazard rate, whereas if gains from trade are decreasing in c,
x∗(c) has an increasing hazard rate.
3.3 Intermediate case
The maximally robust mechanism characterized in Proposition 3.1 provides a useful
benchmark. Nevertheless, the Knightian decision criterion can be viewed as some-
what extreme. Given the stark difference between the optimal mechanism under a sin-
gle subjective prior and the mechanism characterized in Proposition 3.1, it is then of
interest to analyze the case where the buyer’s demand for robustness is less extreme.
To make this analysis tractable, the buyer’s preferences will be represented by the ε-
contamination model, axiomatized by Kopylov (2016) among others, according to which
the buyer has some reference probability distribution F in mind but considers an ε per-
turbation around it. Under this representation, the buyer’s utility function is given by
(1− ε)EF [πb(c)] + ε infG∈cl(co) EG[πb(c)], ε ∈ [01], where F belongs to the closed con-
vex hull of , which is an exogenous information set known to the decision maker that
contains the true probability law on the state space.
In what follows I assume that the buyer has no exogenous information about the
true distribution of seller types so that  contains all probability measures on [01]. This
assumption has the implication that the buyer’s perceived ambiguity is uniform across
the states of the world, which is not without loss of generality. For example, for the
case of independent private values, Carrasco et al. (2017) show that if ε is equal to 1
and  includes only those probability distributions with the same mean, the optimal
mechanism is a random pricing rule, whereas Proposition 3.1 shows that if  contains all
probability distributions on [01], the optimal mechanism is the (deterministic) pooling
price. How the optimal mechanism changes with  when it takes more general forms
might pose an interesting question for future research.
1Letting g and G, respectively, denote the density function and the cumulative distribution function, the
hazard rate is defined by g(t)1−G(t) .
Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) Robust contracting 185
Given this restriction, the buyer’s payoff function is given by the weighted average of
her subjective expected utility evaluated at F and the minimum payoff over all state re-
alizations. The buyer’s decision model is thus as if she thinks that with probability 1− ε,
the seller’s type is distributed according to F , while with the complementary probabil-
ity it could be any other probability distribution on [01]. The confidence parameter ε
measures the buyer’s degree of ambiguity aversion. The buyer’s optimization problem
is then given by
max
x∈	
(1− ε)
∫ 1
0
H(c)x(c)dc + ε inf
c∈[01]
{
x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(u)du
}
 ε ∈ (01) (III)
Under this preference representation, the buyer faces a trade-off between maximizing
her subjective expected utility evaluated at F and limiting the worst-case scenario. As
shown above, the former objective is achieved by offering the posted price c∗, whereas
the worst-case payoff is maximized by offering the menu characterized in Proposi-
tion 3.1. For the remainder of the analysis I assume that H(c) is strictly decreasing in c.
Under this assumption, the problem in the absence of ambiguity (ε= 0) is solvable with-
out the use of ironing techniques. Furthermore, I restrict attention to the case where the
buyer’s valuation is strictly increasing in the seller’s type. This restriction is less essential
but simplifies some of the exposition. The next proposition shows that under these as-
sumptions, the optimal menu is characterized by two parameters: a minimum payoff π¯
that lies between the minimum payoff under the optimal posted price in the absence of
ambiguity, π¯min, and the minimum payoff under the menu that perfectly hedges against
ambiguity, π¯max, as well as a threshold cˆ, below which the buyer trades with probability
1 and above which she obtains her minimum payoff or trades with probability 0.
Proposition 3.2. Assume H ′(c) < 0 and v′(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [01]. Letting x∗ denote
the solution of problem (III), there exists a threshold cˆ ∈ [0 c∗] and a minimum payoff
π¯ ∈ [π¯min π¯max] such that
• x∗(c)= 1 for all c ∈ [0 cˆ],
• x∗(c) is such that x∗(c)(c)− ∫ c0 x∗(u)du=Max{π¯0} for all c ∈ (cˆ1].
According to Proposition 3.2, at the optimal mechanism there exists a set of low type
sellers, [0 cˆ], who are bunched and trade at a base price, while the trading probability of
the remaining sellers is such that the buyer’s payoff is constant across (cˆ1]. In particu-
lar, if the buyer’s minimum payoff π¯ associated with the optimal mechanism is weakly
negative, types above the threshold cˆ trade with probability 0 and the optimal mecha-
nism can be interpreted as a posted price equal to cˆ, whereas if the minimum payoff π¯ is
strictly positive, the trading probability for types above the threshold cˆ is strictly positive
and strictly decreasing. In the latter case, the optimal mechanism separates all types in
the interval (cˆ1]. Notice also that if cˆ = c∗ and π¯ = π¯min, the mechanism characterized
in Proposition 3.2 corresponds to the posted price c∗, while if cˆ = 0 and π¯ = π¯max, it
corresponds to the maximally robust menu characterized in Proposition 3.1.
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To see why this type of mechanism is optimal for the buyer, suppose that under the
posted price c∗, the buyer obtains a positive payoff with all seller types, i.e., π¯min ≥ 0.
This is the case when F is sufficiently skewed to the left and gains from trade with low
type sellers are sufficiently large. In such situations, the worst-case scenario for the
buyer is when the seller’s type is strictly greater than c∗ so that the buyer’s offer is re-
jected. Starting from the posted price c∗, suppose now the buyer wishes to increase her
minimum payoff. This requires an increase in the trading probability with seller types
above c∗, which in turn increases the information rent paid to sellers below c∗. When the
information rent paid to these sellers becomes sufficiently large, the buyer’s payoff with
type c = 0 falls below the minimum payoff. If the buyer wishes to increase her minimum
payoff further, she thus needs to decrease the trading probability for some types in the
bunching region. This is optimally done by reducing the upper bound of that region, i.e.,
by reducing the threshold cˆ. At cˆ = 0, the buyer’s minimum payoff reaches its maximum
value, which is equal to π¯max.
If, alternatively, π¯min < 0 so that the buyer makes losses with some seller types when
offering the posted price c∗, increasing the buyer’s minimum payoff above π¯min requires
directly decreasing the threshold below which the seller trades with probability 1, while
keeping the trading probability of the remaining types equal to 0. Thus, so as to in-
crease her minimum payoff, realized when c = 0, the buyer initially needs to decrease
the posted price to cˆ < c∗. Once the posted price is such that the buyer’s minimum pay-
off reaches zero, a further increase in the minimum payoff requires an increase in the
trading probability for sellers above the threshold cˆ, which in turn makes a further de-
crease of that threshold necessary—again up to the point where cˆ = 0 and the minimum
payoff equals π¯max.
The optimal value of cˆ and the optimal minimum payoff π¯ depend on the buyer’s
confidence parameter ε. The next proposition establishes that the optimal mechanism
is a posted price equal to c∗ if and only if ε is sufficiently small, while it is the maximally
robust menu characterized in Proposition 3.1 if and only if ε is sufficiently large. It also
shows that there exists a nonempty region of intermediate values of ε, where the optimal
menu combines features of both of these mechanisms.
Proposition 3.3. Assume H ′(c) < 0 and v′(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [01]. The optimal value of
the buyer’s minimum payoff π¯ is increasing in ε, while the optimal value of cˆ is decreasing
in ε. Moreover, there exist two values ε and ε with 0≤ ε < ε < 1 such that
• cˆ = c∗ and π¯ = π¯min if and only if ε≤ ε,
• cˆ = 0 and π¯ = π¯max if and only if ε≥ ε.
The result in Proposition 3.3 is very intuitive. The proposition shows that the buyer
optimally hedges against ambiguity by separating the seller through the mechanism if
and only if she is sufficiently doubtful about the model distribution F . The fact that the
threshold of the bunching region, cˆ, is decreasing in ε implies that the lower the buyer’s
confidence in F is, the more separation the optimal mechanism displays.
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Figure 2. Optimal mechanism: π¯min < 0.
The statement of Proposition 3.3 is shown by using techniques familiar from wel-
fare economics. The buyer maximizes the weighted sum of two payoff functions: the
expected payoff EF [πb(c)] and the minimum payoff π¯ = infc∈[01]πb(c). With the struc-
ture of the optimal mechanism established in Proposition 3.2, it is possible to derive
the maximal expected payoff EF [πb(c)] for each value of π¯ ∈ [π¯min π¯max]. The function
connecting the two values is strictly decreasing and can be viewed as the analogue of a
classic utility-possibility frontier. The optimal mechanism for the buyer is then pinned
down by the tangency point between the possibility frontier and the buyer’s indifference
curve between her expected payoff evaluated at F and the minimum payoff π¯, which has
a slope equal to − ε1−ε .
To see how the optimal mechanism depends on the parameter ε, it is useful to dis-
tinguish between the two parameter regimes discussed above, where π¯min is positive or
negative. Suppose first that π¯min < 0: recall that if the buyer’s minimum payoff π¯ lies
in the interval [π¯min0], the corresponding mechanism is a posted price such that the
buyer’s payoff with type c = 0 equals π¯, whereas if π¯ belongs to (0 π¯max], it is a menu
that bunches sellers of low type and separates sellers of high type. The proof of Propo-
sition 3.3 shows that the possibility frontier in this case, illustrated in Figure 2, is strictly
concave. The slope at the lower bound of its domain, π¯min, equals 0, which implies that
a posted price equal to c∗ is optimal if and only if ε = 0. The intuition is that, starting
from the posted price c∗, a marginal decrease in the price has no effect on EF [πb(c)],
whereas it has a positive effect on the buyer’s minimum payoff. At π¯ = 0, the possibility
frontier has a corner. This implies that there exists an interval of values of ε for which
the optimal value of π¯ equals 0 and the associated mechanism is a posted price equal to
gains from trade at c = 0, (0). This mechanism yields a positive payoff with all sellers in
the interval (0(0)), while it yields a zero payoff with the remaining types. If ε exceeds
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Figure 3. Optimal mechanism: π¯min ≥ 0.
the upper bound of that interval, the optimal value of π¯ increases continuously in ε, up
to the point where it reaches π¯max and the optimal mechanism becomes the maximally
robust menu characterized in Proposition 3.1. As Proposition 3.3 shows, this value of ε
is strictly smaller than 1, implying that the maximally robust mechanism is optimal for
a nondegenerate set of parameter values.
Considering next the case π¯min ≥ 0, the utility-possibility frontier has a linear and a
strictly concave part as illustrated in Figure 3.2 If ε is sufficiently small so that the slope
of the indifference curve is greater than the slope of the possibility frontier on its linear
part, the optimal mechanism is the posted price c∗. At the point where these slopes are
the same, the optimal value of π¯ is indeterminate and then increases continuously in ε,
up to the point where it reaches π¯max, as discussed in the previous case.
The two parameter regimes are equivalent for large values of ε, where low types are
bunched while high types are separated and the size of the bunching region decreases
continuously in ε. The main difference arises when ε is small. While for π¯min ≥ 0, the
optimal mechanism is a posted price equal to c∗ for a nondegenerate set of values of ε,
for π¯min < 0, this is not the case. Instead, the buyer optimally reduces the posted price
to a value lower than c∗, even for very small values of ε. Appendix B provides a complete
characterization of the optimal mechanism for both cases. For the specification with
constant gains from trade and a uniform model distribution F , the optimal mechanism
can be described in closed form.
Proposition 3.4. Assume (c)= δ, δ < 1, and F(c)= c for all c ∈ [01].
2If c∗ > 1 so that π¯min > 0, the linear part disappears. The remaining discussion remains valid.
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• Posted Price. If ε≤ 1− 1δe−
1−δ
δ ,
x∗(c)=
{
1 if c ≤ δ
0 if c > δ
• Partial Separation. If ε ∈ (1− 1δe−
1−δ
δ 1− 1δe−
1
δ ),
x∗(c)=
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if c ≤ cˆ
δ− cˆ
δ
e−
c−cˆ
δ if c > cˆ
where cˆ = 1+ δ ln(δ(1− ε)).
• Perfect Separation. If ε≥ 1− 1δe−
1
δ ,
x∗(c)= e− cδ ∀c
Under the assumption (c)= δ and F(c)= c, the optimal mechanism in the bench-
mark case ε= 0 is a posted price equal to δ. The specification thus satisfies π¯min ≥ 0 and
there are three regions of ε to be distinguished. If ε≤ ε= 1− 1δe−
1−δ
δ , the optimal mech-
anism is a posted price equal to δ, whereas if ε≥ ε= 1− 1δe−
1
δ , the optimal mechanism
is a separating menu that perfectly hedges against ambiguity and yields a safe payoff
equal to π¯max = δe− 1 . Alternatively, if ε lies between these two thresholds, the opti-
mal mechanism bunches types below the threshold cˆ = 1+ δ ln(δ(1− ε)) and separates
the remaining seller types. The optimal threshold cˆ is strictly decreasing in the buyer’s
confidence parameter ε, reflecting the hedging function of separating menus in this en-
vironment. Figure 4 illustrated the optimal trading probability x∗(c) and the associated
payoff πb(c) for different values of ε.
The example helps one to understand why, for intermediate values of ε, the buyer
optimally bunches low type sellers and separates high type sellers. Since (c)= δ for all
c ∈ [01], the marginal gain of increasing the trading probability with a particular seller,
given by the respective gains from trade, is the same across all types. The marginal cost
of increasing the trading probability, alternatively, is strictly increasing in the seller’s type
because the buyer has to pay the additional information rent to all lower types. As a
result, the buyer’s expected payoff evaluated at F is maximized when trading with low
type sellers but not with high type sellers. Also the optimal mechanism for a buyer who
demands robustness maximizes the trading probability with low type sellers—by letting
them trade with probability 1 at a base price—but minimizes the trading probability of
high type sellers only up to the point where the minimum payoff is reached.
4. Discussion
4.1 Ambiguity aversion versus risk aversion
Given the longstanding debate on the implications of ambiguity, an important question
in this contracting problem is how the effects of ambiguity aversion differ from those
of risk aversion. It is well known that if utility functions are not quasilinear, separating
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Figure 4. Trading probability x∗(c) and payoff πb(c) for different values of ε ∈ [01].
menus can be optimal, even when there is no ambiguity. The following discussion shows
that the optimality conditions that determine the mechanism under risk aversion are
different from those under ambiguity aversion, and provides some intuition for why this
is the case.
As an example, suppose the buyer’s utility function u is concave in the difference
between her valuation v(c) and the price she pays in exchange for the good. Given the
arguments put forward in Section 3, the seller’s payoff as a function of his type and the
trading probability x(c) can be written as πs(c)=
∫ 1
c x(t)dt so that the price conditional
on trading, denoted by p(c), is given by p(c) = c +
∫ 1
c x(t)dt
x(c) if x(c) > 0 and p(c) = 0 oth-
erwise. Normalizing the buyer’s outside option to zero, the risk-averse buyer with single
prior belief F thus maximizes∫ 1
0
x(c)u
(
(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(t)
x(c)
dt
)
f (c)dc
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subject to the monotonicity constraint on x(c). There exist parameter constellations un-
der which the function x(c) that solves this problem corresponds to a separating menu
rather than a posted price, as can be verified. However, when the buyer’s valuation de-
pends on the seller’s type, the cases in which the solution x(c) corresponds exactly to
the optimal mechanism under ambiguity aversion, whether in the form of Knightian
uncertainty or the ε-contamination model, are nongeneric.
More generally, when the buyer’s type increases in the seller’s type, the way in which
the desire to hedge against ambiguity and to hedge against risk affect the optimal mech-
anism is typically different. The previous section showed that ambiguity aversion favors
the separation of sellers through the mechanism. In particular, the maximally robust
mechanism, which is optimal when the buyer is sufficiently ambiguity averse, is such
that the trading probability strictly decreases in the seller’s type. Such a mechanism still
exposes the buyer to risk since the buyer faces a strictly positive probability of not trad-
ing. In fact, there does not exist a mechanism that yields a riskless payoff. However,
in situations where the buyer’s type does not depend too much on the seller’s type so
that the pooling price yields a positive payoff with all types of seller, the buyer can limit
her downside risk by offering the pooling price. If the buyer is sufficiently risk averse,
the pooling price is then indeed optimal, implying that risk aversion can favor pooling
rather than separation.
As seen in the discussion after Proposition 3.1, the assumption that types are inter-
dependent is crucial for the robust mechanism to be a separating menu. If, alternatively,
the buyer’s valuation does not depend on the seller’s private information, the maximally
robust mechanism characterized in Proposition 3.1 is the pooling price. Interestingly,
when v is constant, offering the pooling price not only yields an unambiguous but also
a riskless payoff for the buyer. Thus, in the independent private value case, hedging
against ambiguity can take the same form as hedging against risk.
4.2 Smooth ambiguity aversion
For a given set of measures, the maxmin expected utility model may be seen as a special
case of the smooth ambiguity model, developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005), with infinite
ambiguity aversion. This section illustrates that the main characteristics of the optimal
contract extend to the case of smooth ambiguity aversion and thus do not hinge on the
kink property of maxmin expected utility. To keep the analysis tractable, I return to the
case of binary types, where the probability distribution of seller types is captured by a
single parameter σ ∈ [01]. In the smooth ambiguity model, the buyer’s utility function
is given by
Eμ
[

(
Eσ [πb]
)]

where μ : [01] → [01] is a subjective prior on a set of probability measures, here cap-
tured by σ ∈ [01], and  : R→ R is a function that weighs realizations of the decision
maker’s expected utility Eσ [πb]. Ambiguity is captured by the second-order belief μ,
which measures the buyer’s belief about a particular σ being the “correct” probability
distribution, while ambiguity attitude is captured by the function . If  is linear, the
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buyer is ambiguity neutral and her preferences are observationally equivalent to those
of a subjective expected utility maximizer. If, alternatively,  is concave, the buyer is
ambiguity averse and prefers known risks over unknown risks. The degree of ambiguity
aversion is measured by the coefficient of absolute ambiguity aversion −′′(x)′(x) .
As in Section 2, the buyer proposes a menu of the form {(1αch+ (1−α)cl) (ααch)}.
The optimization problem of the buyer thus amounts to
max
α∈[01]
Eμ
[

(
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch − (1− α)cl
))]

To make ambiguity matter, assume that μ has positive mass on both [0 σ˜) and (σ˜1],
and assume that ′(·) > 0 and ′′(·) < 0. The first-order condition of the buyer’s opti-
mization problem is given by
Eμ
[
′
(
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch − (1− α)cl
))
(σ˜ − σ) | σ < σ˜]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡MC(α)
= Eμ
[
′
(
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch − (1− α)cl
))
(σ − σ˜) | σ > σ˜]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡MG(α)

The marginal cost of increasing α, MC(α), is the marginal decrease in expected utility in
the probabilistic scenario that pooling is not optimal (σ < σ˜), while the marginal gain
of increasing α, MG(α), is the marginal increase in expected utility in the probabilistic
scenario that pooling is optimal (σ > σ˜). Concavity of  implies that the marginal cost
is increasing in α, whereas the marginal gain is decreasing in α. This implies that there
is a unique α that maximizes the buyer’s expected payoff. The conditions for an interior
solution are
MC(0) <MG(0) and MC(1) >MG(1)
The following proposition summarizes this result.
Proposition 4.1. The optimal menu of contracts for a buyer with smooth ambiguity
aversion is {(1α∗ch + (1− α∗)cl) (α∗α∗ch)} with
α∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if MC(0)≥MG(0)
1 if MC(1)≤MG(1)
such that MC
(
α∗
)=MG(α∗) otherwise.
Proposition 4.1 is the smooth counterpart of Proposition 2.1 in the introductory ex-
ample. To see the connection to the optimal mechanism under maxmin expected util-
ity, assume that absolute ambiguity aversion is constant, i.e., −′′(x)′(x) = γ. Assume fur-
ther that the support of μ is [σσ] and that σ < σ˜ < σ . Under maxmin preferences, the
buyer’s optimal mechanism, characterized by αMEU ≡ vl−clvh−cl , makes her payoff unam-
biguous. Under smooth ambiguity aversion, the buyer compromises between maximiz-
ing the second-order expectation of her payoff, EμEσ [πb], and limiting her exposure to
ambiguity. The expected payoff EμEσ [πb] is maximized by offering a posted price (equal
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to either cl or ch), whereas ambiguity is eliminated by offering the menu characterized
by αMEU. The optimal mechanism under smooth ambiguity aversion is a convex com-
bination of the two. If offering the pooling price maximizes EμEσ [πb], then the optimal
contracting parameter α∗ lies in the interval [αMEU1]; otherwise α∗ lies in the inter-
val [0αMEU]. The more ambiguity averse the buyer is, the closer is α∗ to αMEU. This is
summarized in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2. Assume −′′(x)′(x) = γ.
• If Eμ[σ]< σ˜ , then α∗ ∈ [0αMEU] and dα∗dγ ≥ 0.
• If Eμ[σ]> σ˜ , then α∗ ∈ [αMEU1] and dα∗dγ ≤ 0.
5. Conclusion
This paper considers the contracting problem between a seller and a buyer, who de-
mands robustness with regard to the distribution of the seller’s private information, in
an environment with interdependent values. The analysis shows that if the buyer’s val-
uation increases in the seller’s valuation, the nature of the optimal mechanism crucially
depends on the buyer’s confidence in the underlying type distribution. The maximally
robust contract in this situation is a menu that separates all seller types and thereby
hedges against the ambiguity perceived by the buyer. As a result, the larger the buyer’s
demand for robustness is, the more separation the optimal mechanism displays. This
stands in contrast to the case where buyer and seller have independent private values
and a posted price is optimal, no matter what the degree of the buyer’s ambiguity aver-
sion is.
One question not addressed in this paper is how the presence of uncertainty in the
form of ambiguity affects the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. In the environ-
ment considered, gains from trade are strictly positive with each type of seller and are
thus maximized when the buyer offers the pooling price. As the analysis demonstrates,
if the buyer knows the underlying type distribution, she offers a posted price potentially
smaller than the pooling price, whereas if the buyer perceives and dislikes ambiguity,
she proposes a separating menu. How these two mechanisms compare in terms of the
social surplus they generate, and, more generally, how the presence of ambiguity affects
the welfare of trading parties in environments with asymmetric information might be
an interesting question for future research.
Appendix A
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The buyer maximizes infσ∈[σσ] Eσ [πb]. To identify the minimizing prior, consider
∂Eσ [πb]
∂σ
= α(vh − cl)− (vl − cl)
194 Sarah Auster Theoretical Economics 13 (2018)
The buyer’s payoff Eσ [πb] is decreasing in σ for all α ≤ vl−clvh−cl and increasing in σ
for all α ≥ vl−clvh−cl . We thus have σ ∈ arg infσ∈[σσ] Eσ [πb] if α ≤
vl−cl
vh−cl holds and σ ∈
arg infσ∈[σσ] Eσ [πb(α)] if α ≥ vl−clvh−cl holds. The buyer consequently maximizes the step
function
=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch + (1− α)cl
)
if α≤ vl − cl
vh − cl 
σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)
(
vl − αch + (1− α)cl
)
if α>
vl − cl
vh − cl 
By definition of σ˜ , the buyer’s payoff Eσ [πb] is decreasing in α if σ ≤ σ˜ and increasing
in α if σ ≥ σ˜ . Consequently, if σ ≤ σ˜ , both parts of the step function are decreasing in
α and  is maximized at α = 0. Similarly, if σ ≥ σ˜ , both parts of the step function are
increasing in α and  is maximized at α= 1. If σ < σ˜ < σ ,  is strictly increasing in α on
the interval [0 vl−clvh−cl ] and strictly decreasing in α on the interval [
vl−cl
vh−cl 1], and therefore
is maximized at vl−clvh−cl .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Suppose that the solution of problem (II) is such that πb(c) is constant across c. This
implies that x(c) is differentiable in c. Indeed, notice that, given πb(c) = C for some
C ∈ R, we have x(c)(c) = πs(c) + C for all c ∈ [01]. As πs is absolutely continuous, a
standard consequence of the seller’s incentive constraints, x(c) is continuous in c. But as
πs(c) =
∫ 1
c x(u)du and (c) is differentiable and bounded away from zero, we get from
the fundamental theorem of calculus that x(c) is differentiable in c.
We then have π′b(c) = x′(c)(c) + x(c)v′(c), so the optimal mechanism solves the
differential equation
x′(c)(c)+ x(c)v′(c)= 0 (1)
The solution to (1) is given by x(c)=Dexp[− ∫ c0 v′(t)(t) dt], D ∈R. Together with the condi-
tion x(0) = 1, this yields D = 1 and hence x∗(c) as characterized in Proposition 3.1. Let
the associated (constant) payoff be denoted by π¯max.
We then need to show that any optimal mechanism indeed equalizes the buyer’s pay-
off across c. Consider a nonincreasing function x˜ : [01] → [01] that satisfies x˜(c)(c)−∫ 1
c x˜(u)du ≥ π¯max. We can first show that x˜(c) ≥ x∗(c) for all c. For each c ∈ [01], let
x˜c : [01] → R be an auxiliary function, defined by x˜c(u) = Dc exp[−
∫ u
0
v′(t)
(t) dt] with Dc
such that x˜c(c)= x˜(c). Since x∗(u)= exp[−
∫ u
0
v′(t)
(t) dt], for all c such that x˜(c) < x∗(c), we
have Dc < 1 and hence x˜c(u) < x∗(u) ∀u ∈ [01].
Toward a contradiction, suppose now there exists some c ∈ [01] such that x˜(c) <
x∗(c). Notice that since the payoff with the highest type, x˜(1)(1), must be weakly
greater than π¯max = x∗(1)(1), we have x˜(1) ≥ x∗(1) and hence D1 ≥ 1. Now we know
that Dc < 1 since by assumption x˜(c) < x∗(c). We therefore have x˜(1) > x˜c(1). Since x˜ is
nonincreasing and x˜c is continuous, we then have x˜(u) > x˜c(u) on a left neighborhood
of 1. Let c′ be the supremum of the set {u ∈ [01] : x˜(u) ≤ x˜c(u)}, which is well defined
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as x˜(c) = x˜c(c). Since x˜ is nonincreasing, it must then hold that x˜(c′) ≤ x˜c(c′) < x∗(c′).
Considering the buyer’s payoff with type c′, we obtain
x˜
(
c′
)− ∫ 1
c′
x˜(u)du≤ x˜c′
(
c′
)− ∫ 1
c′
x˜c′(u)du= x˜c′(1)(1) < x∗(1)(1)= π¯max
The first inequality follows from the facts that x˜(c′) = x˜c′(c′) (by definition of x˜c) and
x˜(u) > x˜c′(u) for all u > c′. The following equality follows comes from the property that
the buyer’s payoff is constant in c under x˜c′ . The last inequality follows from x˜(c′) <
x∗(c′), which implies Dc′ < 1 and hence x˜c′(u) < x∗(u) for all u ∈ [01]. Together, this
contradicts our initial assumption x˜(c)(c) − ∫ 1c x˜(u)du ≥ π¯max for all c and therefore
implies x˜(c)≥ x∗(c) for all c.
Finally, consider the buyer’s payoff with type c = 0. Given that the minimum payoff
associated to x˜ must be weakly greater than π¯max, it must hold that
x˜(0)(0)−
∫ 1
0
x˜(u)du≥ (0)−
∫ 1
0
x∗(u)du= π¯max
Since x˜(0)(0) ≤ (0) and x˜(c) ≥ x∗(c) for all c, this inequality can only be satisfied if
x˜(c)= x∗(c) for all c.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.2
To characterize the solution of problem (III), consider the auxiliary optimization prob-
lem, where the endogenous minimum payoff is treated as an exogenous parameter
π¯ ∈R:
max
x∈	
∫ 1
0
H(c)x(c)dc (III′)
subject to the pointwise constraints
x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
x(u)du≥ π¯ ∀c ∈ [01] (2)
Evidently, any solution of problem (III) must also be a solution of (III′) for some π¯,
as otherwise the buyer could increase his expected payoff evaluated at F while main-
taining the same minimum payoff infc∈[01]{x(c)(c) −
∫ 1
c x(u)du}. We can restrict our
attention to values of π¯ that are weakly greater than the minimum payoff under the
mechanism that maximizes
∫ 1
0 H(c)x(c)dc, i.e., that solves problem (I). Recall that this
payoff is given by π¯min = max{(0) − c∗0}. Moreover, the minimum payoff π¯ has to
be weakly smaller than the maximum value of infc∈[01]{x(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c x(u)du}, attained
at the mechanism that solves problem (II), as otherwise the feasible set is empty. This
payoff is given by π¯max = (1)exp(− ∫ 10 v′(t)(t) dt).
It will be useful to derive the function xminπ¯ : [01] → [01] under which the buyer’s
payoff πb(c) is equal to π¯ if π¯ > 0 and equal to 0 if π¯ ≤ 0 for all c ∈ [01]. This re-
quires that the buyer’s payoff is constant across c ∈ [01] and therefore that xminπ¯ (c) =
Dexp[− ∫ c0 v′(t)(t) dt] for some D ∈ R (see Appendix A.2). The associated (constant) payoff
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is equal to max{π¯0} if xminπ¯ (1)(1) = max{π¯0}, i.e., if D = max{π¯0}(1) exp(
∫ 1
0
v′(t)
(t) dt). We
thus have
xminπ¯ (c)=
max{π¯0}
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)

We can first show that the pointwise constraints (2) are satisfied only if x(c) ≥ xminπ¯ (c)
for all c ∈ [01]. First, if π¯ ≤ 0 so that xminπ¯ (c) = 0 for all c ∈ [01], x(c) ≥ xminπ¯ (c) must
be trivially satisfied. Second, if π¯ > 0 and x(c) < xminπ¯ (c) for some c ∈ [01], by an
analogous argument to that in Appendix A.2, there exists some c′ and some function
xc(u)=Dc exp[−
∫ u
0
v′(t)
(t) dt] with Dc such that xc(c)= x(c) such that
x
(
c′
)− ∫ 1
c′
x(u)du≤ xc′
(
c′
)− ∫ 1
c′
xc′(u)du= xc′(1)(1) < xminπ¯ (1)(1)= π¯
thus violating (2).
Suppose now a solution to (III′) exists (which we are going to show later) and let it
be denoted by xπ¯ . We can then demonstrate that for each c ∈ [01], either xπ¯(c) = 1 or
xπ¯(c) = xminπ¯ (c). To see this, let C ≡ {c ∈ [01] : xπ¯(c) ∈ (xminπ¯ (c)1)} and consider the
function xˆ : [01] → [01], defined by
xˆ(c)=
{
1 if c ≤ cˆ
xminπ¯ (c) if c > cˆ
where cˆ ∈ (01) is such that ∫ 10 xˆ(u)du = ∫ 10 xπ¯(u)du. We can first verify that xˆ satisfies
the pointwise constraints (2). For c ≤ cˆ, where xˆ(c) = 1, notice that the buyer’s payoff,
given by (c)− ∫ 1c xˆ(u)du= (c)− (cˆ− c)− ∫ 1cˆ xminπ¯ (u)du, strictly increases in c, so that
the only relevant constraint is (0)− ∫ 10 xˆ(u)du≥ π¯. Since ∫ 10 xˆ(u)du= ∫ 10 xπ¯(u)du, this
constraint is indeed satisfied. For c > cˆ, constraints (2) are satisfied by construction.
Define next the functions Xˆ(c) ≡ ∫ c0 xˆ(u)du and Xπ¯(c) ≡ ∫ c0 xπ¯(u)du, and consider
their difference Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c). Since xˆ(c) ≥ xπ¯(c) for all c ≤ cˆ, Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c) is increas-
ing on [0 cˆ], strictly so on the interior of C.3 Similarly, since xˆ(c) ≤ xπ¯(c) for all c ≥ cˆ,
Xˆ(c) − Xπ¯(c) is decreasing on [cˆ1], again strictly on the interior of C. This together
with Xˆ(0)=Xπ¯(0) and Xˆ(1)=Xπ¯(1) implies that Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c)≥ 0 for all c ∈ [01] and
Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c) > 0 for all c ∈ intC.
Consider then the difference in the buyer’s expected payoff evaluated at F associated
to xˆ and xπ¯ . After an integration by parts, we obtain∫ 1
0
H(c)xˆ(c)dc −
∫ 1
0
H(c)xπ¯(c)dc
= [H(c)[Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c)]]10 −
∫ 1
0
H ′(c)
[
Xˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c)
]
dc
The first term on the right-hand side equals 0. Given H ′(c) < 0 and Xˆ(c) ≥ Xπ¯(c)
for all c ∈ [01] and Xˆ(c) > Xπ¯(c) for all c ∈ intC, the term
∫ 1
0 H
′(c)(Xˆ(c) − Xπ¯(c))dc
3Notice that dXˆ(c)−Xπ¯(c)dc = xˆ(c)− xπ¯(c) almost everywhere.
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is nonnegative, and hence
∫ 1
0 H(c)xˆ(c)dc ≤
∫ 1
0 H(c)xπ¯(c)dc, only if the set intC is
empty.
The previous argument, together with the monotonicity constraint on xπ¯ implies
that there exists a threshold cˆ such that xπ¯(c) = 1 for all c ≤ cˆ and xπ¯(c) = xminπ¯ (c) for
all c > cˆ. Notice that, in principle, the function xπ¯ can take infinitely many values at cˆ.
This is the only degree of flexibility, so setting x= 1 at cˆ is without loss of generality. The
threshold cˆ maximizes the buyer’s expected payoff evaluated at F ,∫ cˆ
0
H(c)dc +
∫ 1
cˆ
H(c)xminπ¯ (c)dc (3)
subject to the pointwise constraints (2). Given the structure of xπ¯ , the only relevant of
those constraints is that for c = 0, as argued above. The first derivative of (3) with respect
to cˆ, given by H(cˆ)(1 − xminπ¯ (cˆ)), shows that (3) is strictly increasing in cˆ on [0 c∗] and
strictly decreasing in cˆ on [c∗0]. The optimal mechanism is therefore characterized by
the maximal value of cˆ on [0 c∗] such that the buyer’s payoff with type c = 0, given by
(0)− cˆ − ∫ 1cˆ xminπ¯ (u)du, is weakly greater than π¯. If this condition is satisfied at cˆ = c∗,
i.e., if
(0)− c∗ −
∫ 1
c∗
max{0 π¯}
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc ≥ π¯ (4)
the optimal mechanism is characterized by the threshold c∗. Otherwise the optimal
threshold is (uniquely) determined by the condition
(0)− cˆ −
∫ 1
cˆ
max{0 π¯}
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc = π¯ (5)
Problem (III′) is thus uniquely solved by the function
xπ¯(c)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if c ≤ cˆ
max{0 π¯}
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
if c > cˆ
(6)
where cˆ = c∗ if (4) is satisfied and cˆ is such that (5) holds otherwise.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Since a solution of problem (III) must also be a solution of (III′) for some π¯ ∈ [π¯min
π¯max], to solve the problem (III), we can consider the simpler problem where the buyer
chooses from the collection of functions xπ¯ as defined in (6) with π¯ ∈ [π¯min π¯max]. The
buyer’s optimization problem can thus be written as
max
xπ¯
(1− ε)
∫ 1
0
H(c)xπ¯(c)dc + ε inf
c∈[01]
{
xπ¯(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c
xπ¯(u)du
}
 (7)
Define F(π¯)=
∫ 1
0 H(c)xπ¯(c)dc and notice that infc∈[01]{xπ¯(c)(c)−
∫ 1
c xπ¯(u)du} = π¯.
Problem (7) is then analogous to the problem of maximizing εF + (1− ε)π¯ subject to
198 Sarah Auster Theoretical Economics 13 (2018)
F = F(π¯), where F(π¯) is the maximal expected payoff evaluated at F as a function
of the minimum payoff π¯, analogous to a conventional utility-possibility frontier. The
optimal mechanism is then determined by the tangency points of the buyer’s indiffer-
ence curves of εF + (1 − ε)π¯ and the possibility constraint F(π¯). The indifference
curves are straight lines with a slope equal to − ε1−ε .
So as to derive the tangency points, it will be useful to distinguish the two cases
where π¯min is positive or negative. Suppose first π¯min ≥ 0 and let πˆ denote the value of π¯
such that (4) is satisfied with equality. Below πˆ the threshold cˆ is equal to c∗, while above
πˆ the value of cˆ is determined by (5). Since this condition depends on π¯, to analyze
F(π¯), we need to find the derivative of cˆ with respect to π¯. Taking the total differential
of (5), we obtain
dcˆ
dπ¯
= −
1+ 1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)
dc
1− π¯
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
cˆ
v′(t)
(t)
dt
) 
With this, we have
′F(π¯)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
(1)
∫ 1
c∗
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
H(c)dc if π¯ ∈ [π¯min πˆ]
−H(cˆ)− 1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)(
H(cˆ)−H(c))dc if π¯ ∈ (πˆ π¯max] (8)
′′F(π¯)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if π¯ ∈ [π¯min πˆ]
−H ′(cˆ)
(
1+ 1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc
)
dcˆ
dπ¯
if π¯ ∈ (πˆ π¯max]
It can be verified that the derivative of F(π¯) at π¯ = πˆ exists and that ′F(π¯) is strictly
negative and weakly decreasing in π¯. The function F(π¯) is thus differentiable, strictly
decreasing, and weakly concave on its domain. More specifically, F(π¯) is linear on
[0 πˆ] and strictly concave on [πˆ π¯max]. This implies that there exists only one param-
eter point at which the buyer’s problem has multiple solutions, namely when ε is such
that − ε1−ε =′F(π¯), π¯ ∈ [0 πˆ].
We can then derive the thresholds ε and ε. The optimal mechanism is characterized
by π¯ = 0 if ′F(0)≤ − ε1−ε , while it is characterized by π¯ = π¯max if ′F(π¯max)≥ − ε1−ε . We
thus have ε= −′F (0)1−′F (0) and ε=
−′F (π¯max)
1−′F (π¯max) . Since
′
F(0) and
′
F(π
max) take finite, nonzero
values, we have 0< ε< ε< 1.
Consider next the case π¯min < 0. Under this specification, πˆ = π¯min. The threshold cˆ
is therefore always determined by condition (5). For weakly negative values of π¯, xπ¯(c)
is a function with a single step at (0)− cˆ and so F(π¯) =
∫ (0)−π¯
0 H(c)dc for all π¯ ≤ 0.
The first and second derivatives of F(π¯) in this case are
′F(π¯)= −H
(
(0)− π¯)< 0 and ′′F(π¯)=H ′((0)− π¯)< 0
On [π¯min0], F(π¯) is thus strictly decreasing and strictly concave. The properties of
F(π¯) for π¯ > 0 have been described above. At π¯ = 0, the function F(π) has a corner.
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To see this, notice that ′F(−)(0)= −H((0)) and
′F(+)(0) = −H
(
(0)
)− 1
(1)
∫ 1
(0)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)(
H
(
(0)
)−H(c))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dc
< −H((0))
Since ′F(−)(0) > 
′
F(+)(0), the derivative function of F(π¯) is strictly decreasing in π¯.
The function F(π¯) is thus strictly concave and the solution of the buyer’s optimization
problem is consequently unique.
Again we can derive the thresholds ε and ε. Given that ′F(π¯
min)= −H(c∗)= 0, the
condition ′F(π¯
min) ≥ − ε1−ε can only be satisfied when ε = 0. We thus have ε = 0 and,
equivalently to the previous case, ε= −′F (π¯max)1−′F (π¯max) < 1.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
For the specification (c) = δ, δ < 1, and F(c) = c, we have H(c) = δ − c and hence
c∗ = δ. As can be verified, this implies π¯min = πˆ = 0. Thus, the threshold cˆ is determined
by condition (5). Under the stated assumptions, this condition simplifies to π¯ = (δ −
cˆ)e− 1−cˆδ . We then obtain
xπ¯(c)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if c ≤ cˆ
1
δ
π¯ exp
(
1− c
δ
)
if c > cˆ
and thus
F(π¯)=
∫ cˆ
0
H(c)dc +
∫ 1
cˆ
1
δ
π¯ exp
(
1− c
δ
)
H(c)dc ′F(π¯)= 1− δexp
(
1− cˆ
δ
)

with cˆ such that π¯ = (δ− cˆ)e− 1−cˆδ for all π¯ ∈ [π¯min π¯max].
We can then derive the thresholds ε = −′F (0)1−′F (0) and ε =
−′F (π¯max)
1−′F (π¯max) . Noticing that ac-
cording to (5), cˆ = δ at π¯ = 0 and cˆ = 0 at π¯ = π¯max, we have
ε= 1− 1
δ
exp
(
−1− δ
δ
)
 ε= 1− 1
δ
exp
(
−1
δ
)

With π¯max = δe− 1δ , the optimal mechanism for ε≤ ε and ε≥ ε is then, respectively, char-
acterized by
x∗(c)=
{
1 if c ≤ δ
0 if c > δ
and x∗(c)= e− cδ  c ∈ [01]
Finally, we consider the case ε ∈ (εε). Here the optimal mechanism is characterized
by the condition −′F(π¯)= ε1−ε ; that is,
−1+ δexp
(
1− cˆ
δ
)
= ε
1− ε
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Solving for cˆ yields cˆ = 1 + δ ln(δ(1 − ε)). Recalling that π¯ = (δ − cˆ)e− 1−cˆδ , the optimal
mechanism is characterized by
x∗(c)=
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if c ≤ cˆ
δ− cˆ
δ
e−
c−cˆ
δ if c > cˆ
where cˆ = 1+ δ ln(δ(1− ε)).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Under constant absolute ambiguity aversion, we have (x) = − 1γ e−γx (see Klibanoff
et al. 2005).
Suppose first that Eμ[σ] > σ˜ holds. Note that EμEσ [πb] increases in α and that
Varμ[Eσ [πb]] > 0 for all α < αMEU. This implies that the expected utility distribution
induced by any α < αMEU is second-order stochastically dominated by the (degenerate)
distribution induced by αMEU. Since  is strictly concave, this implies α∗ ∈ [αMEU1].
Letting σ(α) = σα(vh − ch)+ (1− σ)(vl − αch − (1− α)cl), the optimal value of α∗
is characterized by
Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜)]= 0 (9)
if the solution is interior (otherwise a marginal change in γ has no effect). Taking the
total differential yields
dα∗
dγ
= −Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜)σ(α∗)]
γEμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜)2] ;
dα∗
dγ ≤ 0 if the numerator is weakly positive on the interval [αMEU1]. Suppose not. Then
Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ˜ − σ)σ(α∗) | σ ≤ σ˜]
> Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜)σ(α∗) | σ ≥ σ˜]
But
Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ˜ − σ)σ(α∗) | σ ≤ σ˜]
≤σ˜
(
α∗
)
Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ˜ − σ) | σ ≤ σ˜]
=σ˜
(
α∗
)
Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜) | σ ≥ σ˜]
≤ Eμ
[
exp
(−γσ(α∗))(σ − σ˜)σ(α∗) | σ ≥ σ˜]
which follows from (9) and the fact that ∂σ(α)∂σ > 0 ∀α ∈ [αMEU1]—a contradiction.
Hence, dα
∗
dγ ≤ 0.
The proof for the case Eμ[σ] < σ˜ is analogous, where the above inequalities are re-
versed. Just note that second-order stochastic dominance implies α∗ ∈ [0αMEU] and
that ∂σ(α)∂σ < 0 ∀α ∈ [0αMEU].
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Appendix B: Full characterization of the optimal mechanism
Proposition B.1. Assume H ′(c) < 0 and v′(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [01]. If π¯min ≥ 0, the so-
lution of problem (III) is generically unique and the optimal mechanism is characterized
by
• π¯ = 0 and cˆ = c∗ if ε < ε,
• π¯ ∈ [0 πˆ] and cˆ = c∗ if ε= ε, where πˆ is such that
πˆ = (0)− c∗ −
∫ 1
c∗
πˆ
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc
• π¯ and cˆ such that
ε
1− ε = H(cˆ)+
1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(cˆ)−H(c))dc
π¯ = (0)− cˆ −
∫ 1
cˆ
π¯
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc
if ε ∈ (εε),
• π¯ = π¯max and cˆ = 0 if ε≥ ε,
where ε and ε, respectively, are defined by
ε
1− ε = −
1
(1)
∫ 1
c∗
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
H(c)dc
ε
1− ε = H(0)+
1
(1)
∫ 1
0
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(0)−H(c))dc
Proof. The derivative function of F(π¯) is as derived in (8). The threshold ε is such
that the slope of the indifference curve coincides with the derivative of the possibility
frontier at π¯ ∈ [π¯min πˆ]:
− ε
1− ε =
1
(1)
∫ 1
c∗
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
H(c)dc
For all ε≤ ε, we then have cˆ = c∗ and π¯ = 0.
The threshold ε is such that the slope of the indifference curve coincides with the
derivative of the possibility frontier at π¯ = π¯max. At π¯ = π¯max, condition (5) yields cˆ = 0.
Given this, the threshold ε is characterized by
− ε
1− ε = −H(0)−
1
(1)
∫ 1
0
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(0)−H(c))dc
For ε≥ ε, we therefore have cˆ = 0 and π¯ = π¯max.
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Finally, if ε ∈ (εε), the optimal value of π¯ is pinned down by the tangency point
between the indifference curve and the possibility frontier on its strictly concave part,
− ε
1− ε = −H(cˆ)−
1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(cˆ)−H(c))dc
where cˆ is determined by (5). 
Proposition B.2. Assume H ′(c) < 0 and v′(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [01]. If π¯min < 0, the solu-
tion of problem (III) is unique and the optimal mechanism is characterized by
• π¯ = (0)− cˆ with cˆ such that H(cˆ)= ε1−ε if ε < ε′,
• π¯ = 0 and cˆ = (0) if ε ∈ [ε′ ε′′],
• π¯ and cˆ such that
ε
1− ε = H(cˆ)+
1
(1)
∫ 1
cˆ
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(cˆ)−H(c))dc
π¯ = (0)− cˆ −
∫ 1
cˆ
π¯
(1)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
dt
)
dc
if ε ∈ (ε′′ ε),
• π¯ = π¯max and cˆ = 0 if ε≥ ε,
where ε′, ε′′, and ε, respectively, are defined by
ε′
1− ε′ = H
(
(0)
)

ε′′
1− ε′′ = H
(
(0)
)+ 1
(1)
∫ 1
(0)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H
(
(0)
)−H(c))dc
ε
1− ε = H(0)+
1
(1)
∫ 1
0
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H(0)−H(c))dc
Proof. As argued above, when π¯min < 0, the derivative of F(π¯) at π¯ is equal to 0,
implying that π = π¯min is optimal if and only if ε = 0. We also noted that F(π¯) has
a corner at π¯ = 0. The threshold ε′ is the value of ε at which the slope of the indifference
curve is equal to the left derivative of F(π¯) at π¯ = 0. Recalling that for π¯ < 0, we have
′F(π¯)= −H((0)− π¯), ε′ is characterized by
− ε
′
1− ε′ = −H
(
(0)
)

For all ε < ε′, the optimal mechanism is then characterized by the tangency point
− ε1−ε = −H((0)− π¯), while cˆ is such that the buyer’s payoff at c = 0 is equal to π¯, i.e.,
cˆ = (0)− π¯.
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Next, ε′′ is the value of ε such that the slope of the indifference curve is equal to the
right derivative of F(π¯) at π¯ = 0. Noting that at π¯ = 0, condition (5) yields cˆ = (0); ε′′
is defined by
− ε
′′
1− ε′′ = −H
(
(0)
)− 1
(1)
∫ 1
(0)
exp
(∫ 1
c
v′(t)
(t)
)(
H
(
(0)
)−H(c))dc
For all ε ∈ [ε′ ε′′], we then have π¯ = 0 and cˆ = (0).
Finally, for ε > ε′′, the characterization of the optimal mechanism is analogous to
the mechanism in Proposition B.1 when ε > ε. 
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